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Abstract
In a combinatorial auction, multiple items are for sale simultaneously
to a set of buyers. These buyers are allowed to place bids on subsets
of the available items. A special kind of combinatorial auction is the
so-called matrix bid auction, which was developed by Day (2004). The
matrix bid auction imposes restrictions on what a bidder can bid for a
subsets of the items. This paper focusses on the winner determination
problem, i.e. deciding which bidders should get what items. The winner
determination problem of a general combinatorial auction is NP-hard and
inapproximable. We discuss the computational complexity of the winner
determination problem for a special case of the matrix bid auction. We
present two mathematical programming formulations for the general ma-
trix bid auction winner determination problem. Based on one of these
formulations, we develop two branch-and-price algorithms to solve the
winner determination problem. Finally, we present computational results
for these algorithms and compare them with results from a branch-and-
cut approach based on Day & Raghavan (2006).
Keywords: Combinatorial auction, matrix bids, winner deter-
mination, computation complexity, branch-and-price
1 Introduction
In an auction where multiple bidders are interested in multiple items, it is often
the case that the value of a set of items is higher or lower than the sum of the
values of the individual items. These so-called complementarity or substitution-
e®ects, respectively, may be bidder-speci¯c. A combinatorial auction is a way
to make use of this synergy phenomenon. In such an auction a buyer is allowed
to place bids on a subset of the items, sometimes called a bundle. The auction
is concluded when the auctioneer decides to accept some of the bids and to
allocate the items accordingly to the bidders.
In a combinatorial auction in its most general form, bidders can bid whatever
amount they please on any subset of items. The problem of deciding which
bidders should get what items in order to maximize the auctioneer's revenue
is called the winner determination problem. This problem is NP-hard since
(Rothkopf, Peke» c & Harstad 1998) and cannot be approximated to a ratio of
max(K²¡1;m²¡1=2) in polynomial time for any ¯xed ² > 0 (unless P=ZPP),
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1where K is the number of bundles on which a bid has been made, and m is the
number of items (Sandholm 2002). This result holds even if every item occurs
in at most two bids and all prices are equal to 1.
Numerous attempts to cope with this computational complexity can be found in
literature. One approach is to impose restrictions on what a bidder can bid for
these sets. A common restriction on a bidder's preferences is that they should
be non-decreasing, i.e. the valuation for a set S1 can not be higher than the
valuation for a set S2 if S1 is a subset of S2. Another restriction can be that the
preferences should be supermodular. This means that the sum of valuations for
two sets should not be higher than the sum of the valuation of the union of both
sets and the valuation of the intersection of both sets. If there are only two bid
functions a bidder can have, both of them non-decreasing, integer valued and
supermodular, then de Vries & Vohra (2003) point out that the winner deter-
mination problem of this auction can be solved in polynomial time. For other
results based on restricting preferences, we refer to Nisan (2000) and Tennen-
holtz (2002).
The matrix bid auction, which was developed by Day (2004), is also a combi-
natorial auction in which restrictions are imposed on what a bidder can bid. In
the matrix bid auction, each bidder must submit a strict ordering (or ranking)
of the items in which he1 is interested. We assume that for each bidder, the
extra value an item adds to a set is determined only by the number of higher
ranked items in that set, according to the ranking of that bidder. Let G be the
set of items, indexed by i and B the set of bidders, indexed by j. The ordering
of the items is denoted by rij, which is item i's position in bidder j's ranking,
for each i 2 G and j 2 B. This ordering should be strict in the sense that for
each bidder j, ri1j 6= ri2j for any pair of distinct items i1 and i2. For instance,
if rij = 2, item i is bidder j's second highest ranked item. Furthermore, each
bidder j speci¯es values bijk, which correspond to the value the bidder is pre-
pared to pay for item i given that it is the k-th highest ranked item in the set
that bidder j is awarded. The bijk values allow to determine the value bidder
j attributes to any set S µ G. Indeed, bidder j's bid on a set S is denoted as





where k(i;j;S) is the ranking of item i amongst the items in the set S, according
to bidder j's ranking. Notice that equation (1) assumes that no externalities are
involved, i.e. a bidder's valuation depends only on the items he wins, and not
for instance on the identity of the bidders to whom the other items are allocated.
Furthermore, the matrix bid auction is a multi-item, single-unit combinatorial
auction. This means that for each item that is auctioned, only one unit of this
item is available. The winner determination problem is, given the bids bj(S)
for each set S and each bidder j, to determine which bidder is to receive which
items, such that the total winning bid value is maximized. Notice that we as-
sume that each bidder pays what he bids for the subsets he wins.
1he can be replaced by she (and his by her)
2Observe that the value for index k of item i in bidder j's bid can never be higher
than the rank rij. This allows us to arrange the values bijk as a lower triangular
matrix for each bidder j, where the rows correspond to the items, ordered by
decreasing rank and the columns correspond to values for k. Hence the name
matrix bid (with order). Notice also that bidder j's ranking rij does not nec-
essarily re°ect a preference order of the items. If an item is highly ranked, this
merely means that its added value to a set depends on less items than the added
value of a lower ranked item. Furthermore, we make no assumption regarding
the bijk values. Indeed, these values may be negative, e.g. to re°ect the dis-
posal cost of an unwanted item. Specifying a su±ciently large negative value
can also keep the bidder from winning this item in the ¯rst place. For a more
elaborate discussion of the expressiveness of matrix bids and their relation to
well-known micro-economic properties, we refer to Goossens & Spieksma (2006).
There are several reasons for investigating a combinatorial auction with matrix
bids. First, bids in any practical combinatorial auction are likely to posses some
structure. In literature, we ¯nd references of both theoretical structures (see e.g.
Rothkopf et al. (1998), Nisan (2000), and Leyton-Brown & Shoham (2005)) and
structures in practice (see e.g. Bleischwitz & Kliewer (2005) and Goossens,
Maas, Spieksma & van de Klundert (2007)). Capturing and understanding this
structure is important, not only since it allows to develop algorithms that can
be more e±cient than algorithms for a general combinatorial auction, but also
because it improves our understanding of various properties of an auction. The
matrix bid auction, where the incremental value an item adds to a bid on a set is
determined only by the number of higher ranked items in that set, imposes one
such structure. Thus, the matrix bid auction o®ers a way of capturing structure
that may be present in combinatorial auctions. Second, matrix bid auctions
allow for a faster computation due to the restriction on the preferences that is
assumed. Indeed, Day & Raghavan (2006) show that the computation time for
the general combinatorial auction is higher and grows much faster than for the
matrix bid auction. Finally, the matrix bid auction also o®ers a compact way
of representing preferences. Indeed, each bidder only needs to communicate an
ordered list of m items and
m(m+1)
2 matrix bid entries, which is far less than
bids for each of the 2m possible sets of items in a general combinatorial auction.
These arguments are explored in more detail in Goossens & Spieksma (2006).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the
computational complexity of the special case of the matrix bid auction winner
determination problem that arises if all bidders have the same ranking of the
items. Section 3 deals with two mathematical programming formulations for
the general matrix bid auction winner determination problem. Based on one
of these formulations, we develop two branch-and-price algorithms to solve the
winner determination problem in section 4. Finally, in section 5, we present
computational results for these algorithms and compare them with results from
the branch-and-cut approach by Day (2004).
32 Computational complexity
The key assumption in the matrix bid auction is that for each bidder, the extra
value an item adds to a set depends only on the number of higher ranked items
in that set, according to the ranking of that bidder. Despite this restriction,
the winner determination problem of the matrix bid auction remains NP-hard
(Day 2004). Even if each bidder has the same ranking of the items, the matrix
bid auction winner determination problem remains NP-hard. Moreover, unless
P = NP, there exists no polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for
this problem.
Theorem 1. There exists no polynomial-time approximation scheme for the
winner determination problem for the matrix bid auction where all bidders have
an identical ranking of the items, unless P = NP.
Proof. We consider the winner determination problem for the matrix bid auc-
tion where all bidders have an identical ranking. We refer to this problem as
MBI. The reduction is from the 3-dimensional matching (3DM) problem. The
3DM problem is described as follows: given a set M µ X £ Y £ Z of triples,
where each of the sets X, Y and Z has exactly q elements, ¯nd the largest
matching in M. Kann (1991) shows that it is NP-hard to decide whether there
exists a matching of size q, or whether every matching has a size of at most
(1 ¡ ±)q for some ¯xed ± > 0 (see also Petrank (1994)).
Every instance of 3DM can be reduced to an MBI instance in polynomial time.
Suppose that the 3q elements of the sets X, Y , and Z correspond to 3q items and
that each 3-element subset in M corresponds to a bidder. We pick an arbitrary
ordering of the items and let this be the ranking of the items for each bidder.
Each bidder thus has a matrix bid with this ranking and with the following
entries. The highest ranked item of the triple corresponding to the bidder gets
a value of 1 in the ¯rst column, the second highest ranked item gets a value of
2 in the second column, and the third highest ranked item gets a value of 3 in
the third column. All other entries get a value of zero.
If an instance of 3DM has a matching of size q, then the corresponding instance
of MBI has a solution of value 6q. Indeed, a solution of 3DM consists of q
pairwise disjoint 3-element subsets, corresponding to q bidders in MBI. Each
supplier has a bid of 6 for the 3 items represented by the 3-element subset.
Accepting these bids leads to a sum of winning bids equal to 6q. Since every
element of X [ Y [ Z occurs exactly once in the solution of 3DM, every item
will also be auctioned exactly once in the MBI solution.
If our instance of 3DM has a matching of size at most (1¡±)q, at most (1¡±)q
entries with value 3 in the matrix bids can be used, resulting in a MBI solution
value of (1 ¡ ±)6q. Notice that for a maximal solution value, we need to use
a maximal number of entries with value 3. The number of items remaining is
3q ¡ 3(1 ¡ ±)q = 3±q. Each pair of these items adds at most 3 to the solution
value, resulting in a maximal solution value for MBI of







4Consequently, a polynomial-time approximation scheme for MBI would imply
that we could distinguish between instances of 3DM with a matching of size q
and instances where every matching has a size of at most (1 ¡ ±)q, which is an
NP-hard problem (Kann 1991). ¤
Notice that it follows from theorem 1 that the winner determination problem
for the matrix bid auction where bidders have an identical ranking of the items
is NP-hard. In this theorem, the number of bidders is part of the input. In the
case that the number of bidders is ¯xed (and we still assume identical rankings),
the winner determination problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Theorem 2. The winner determination problem for a matrix bid auction with
a ¯xed number of bidders, all having an identical ordering of the items, can be
solved in polynomial time.
Proof. We will show that the winner determination problem for a matrix bid
auction with a ¯xed number of bidders, say n, all having an identical ranking r
of the items, say 1;2;:::;m, can be solved by solving a longest path problem on
an acyclic graph involving O(mn+2) nodes and O(nmn+2) arcs.
This graph contains nodes indexed by (i;s1;s2;:::;sn;k), a source, and a sink.
The index i refers to item i and ranges from 1 to m. The indices sj, with
j 2 f1;2;:::;ng, and k range from 0 to ri, with
P
j sj + k = ri. There are





j > sj for all j 2 f1;2;:::;ng, and that k0 > k. Furthermore, there is an
arc from the source to each node (1;s1;s2;:::;sn;k), and an arc from each




n;k0) has a cost of bi+1;j;s0
j where j is the index for which
s0
j = sj + 1, if k0 = k. If k0 = k + 1, then this arc has a cost of zero. All arcs to
the sink also have a cost of zero. The graph is depicted in Figure 1 for a setting
with 2 items and 2 bidders. All arcs without indication of the corresponding
cost have a cost equal to zero.
The graph described above should be interpreted as follows. Each node (i;s1;s2;
:::;sn;k) corresponds to a state where a decision has been made on the alloca-
tion of item i and all items ranked higher than i, with each bidder j receiving
sj items and k items remaining with the auctioneer. Selecting an arc from
(i;s1;s2;:::;sn;k) to (i + 1;s0
1;s0
2;:::;s0
n;k0) therefore corresponds to allocating
item i+1 to that bidder j for which s0
j = sj +1. If there is no such bidder, then
item i+1 remains with the auctioneer (and k0 = k +1). In this way, each path
from source to sink determines how the items are to be allocated, and there is
a path from the source to the sink for each possible allocation.
We now sketch the equivalence between the length of a path in the graph and
the value of an allocation of the items. We know that in a matrix bid, the value
of adding an item i to a set is determined only by the number of higher ranked
items. Since the graph contains only arcs from higher ranked items to lower
ranked items, the e®ect of adding an item i to a set on the bid for this set can



















Figure 1: Illustration of the graph for 2 items and 2 bidders
the path. The cost of an arc is nothing else but the appropriate entry from
the matrix bid of the bidder receiving the item. This means that the length
of any path from source to sink corresponds to
P
j bj(Sj), where Sj is the set
of items allocated to bidder j, according to that path. Therefore, the winner
determination problem for a matrix bid auction with a ¯xed number of bidders,
all having an identical ordering of the items, can be solved by solving a longest
path problem. This can be done in polynomial time, since the underlying graph
is acyclic. ¤
3 Mathematical formulations
In this section, we present two mathematical formulations for the matrix bid
auction winner determination problem. The ¯rst formulation (see also Day
(2004)) is inspired by the assignment problem, the second by the set packing
problem. We show that the LP-relaxations of both formulations are equally
strong.
We de¯ne the binary variable xijk to be 1 if bidder j receives item i as the k-th
best item, and 0 otherwise. This leads to the formulation below, to which we














xijk 6 1 8i 2 G (3)
X
i2G:rij¸k






xljk¡1 8i 2 G;8j 2 B;8k 2 f2;:::;rijg
(5)
xijk 2 f0;1g 8i 2 G;8j 2 B;8k 2 f1;:::;rijg
(6)
Constraints (3) enforce that each item can be assigned to at most one bidder,
while constraints (4) make sure that for each bidder, at most one item is the
k-th best item in the set this bidder gets. Finally, constraints (5) impose that a
bidder cannot get an item as the k-th best item in a set, unless a higher ranked
item was assigned to this bidder as his (k ¡ 1)-th best item in this set. Con-
straints (6) are the integrality constraints.
Notice that the formulation (2)-(6) is not the minimal correct formulation for
the matrix bid winner determination problem. Indeed, constraints (4) for
k 2 f2;:::;rijg are redundant in (2)-(6), since they are already enforced by
constraints (4) for k = 1 and constraints (5). Also, replacing constraints (5)




xljk¡1 8i 2 G;8j 2 B;8k 2 f2;:::;rijg:
However, with this formulation, all constraints (4) remain necessary.
The set packing formulation below makes use of binary variables y(S;j), which
equals 1 if bidder j wins set S, and 0 otherwise. The ¯rst set of constraints
(8) enforces that each item is awarded to at most one bidder. The second set
of constraints guarantees (9) that no bidder receives more than one set. The












y(S;j) 6 1 8i 2 G (8)
X
SµG
y(S;j) 6 1 8j 2 B (9)
y(S;j) 2 f0;1g 8S µ G;8j 2 B (10)
Notice that this set packing formulation can also be used for the winner deter-
mination problem of a general combinatorial auction. Indeed, the matrix bid
auction only di®ers from a general combinatorial auction in the way bj(S) is
computed. Notice also that the assignment formulation is polynomially sized in
the number of bidders and the number of items. This is not the case for the set
packing formulation. In the following theorem, we prove that the LP-relaxation
of the set packing formulation and the LP-relaxation of the assignment formu-
lation are equally strong.
Theorem 3. The LP relaxation of the assignment formulation and the LP
relaxation of the set packing formulation are equally strong. Moreover, if the
assignment formulation has an integral solution that is optimal with respect to
the LP-relaxation, this is also the case for the assignment formulation, and vice
versa.
Proof. In order to prove the ¯rst part of this theorem, we need to show that
the LP-relaxation of the set packing formulation is at least as strong as the LP-
relaxation of the assignment formulation and vice versa. In order to prove the
¯rst relation, we need to show that any solution ^ y of the LP-relaxation of the
set packing formulation can be transformed to a solution ^ x of the LP-relaxation
of the assignment formulation with the same objective function value. This is
accomplished by the following procedure. For the remainder of this proof, if we
mention a formulation, we mean in fact its LP-relaxation.
First, we initialize all variables ^ xijk to 0, for all i 2 G, j 2 B, and k 2 f1;:::;rijg.
We consider each variable ^ y(S;j), with S µ G and j 2 B once, and set for each
item i in S
^ xi;j;k(i;j;S) Ã ^ xi;j;k(i;j;S) + ^ y(S;j): (11)
Thus, in this procedure, the value of each variable ^ y(S;j) is added to jSj ^ xijk
variables, namely those with item i 2 S, and k = k(i;j;S). It follows that the











^ y(S;j) 8i 2 G;j 2 B: (12)










^ y(S;j) 6 1: (13)
Notice that the last inequality follows from the feasibility of ^ y (see (8)). We also
















^ y(S;j) 6 1; (14)
which shows that ^ x satis¯es (4). Finally, we have that for each i 2 G, j 2 B,



























Consider some ^ y(S;j) occurring in the ¯rst term. The corresponding set S has
at the k-th position (k > 2) some item l, rlj 6 rij. It follows that there must
be some other item, say l0 with rl0j 6 rlj at position k ¡ 1. Hence this ^ y(S;j)
also occurs in the second term. It follows that the expression (16) cannot have
a positive value, and hence (5) is satis¯ed. Notice also that the transformation
procedure (11) does not a®ect the objective function value. Moreover, it trans-
forms any integral solution ^ y to an integral solution ^ x.
Hence, we have shown that the set packing formulation is at least as strong as
the assignment formulation and if the set packing formulation has an integral
solution that is optimal with respect to the LP-relaxation, this is also the case
for the assignment formulation. In the remainder of this proof, we show that
the assignment formulation is at least strong as the set packing formulation.
In order to prove this second relation, we show that any solution ^ x of the
LP-relaxation of the assignment formulation can be transformed to a solution
^ y of the LP-relaxation of the set packing formulation with the same objective
function value. This is accomplished by the following procedure, CONVERT(^ x).
9Algorithm 1 CONVERT(^ x)
for (j 2 B) do
Initialize ^ y(S;j) Ã 0 for all S µ G;
Step 1:
for (i 2 G) do
^ y(fig;j) Ã ^ xij1
end for
Step 2:
for (k = 2 to m) do
for (i 2 G: rij = k to m) do
Step 2a:
T = fS µ fi0 : ri0j < rijg : jSj = k ¡ 1g;
while (^ xijk > 0) do
Pick a set S from T and remove S from T;
if (^ xijk > ^ y(S;j)) then
^ y(S [ fig;j) Ã ^ y(S;j);
^ xijk Ã ^ xijk ¡ ^ y(S;j);
^ y(S;j) Ã 0;
else
^ y(S [ fig;j) Ã ^ xijk;
^ y(S;j) Ã ^ y(S;j) ¡ ^ xijk;






10The CONVERT procedure translates any solution for the assignment formula-
tion to a solution for set packing formulation. First, we argue that the CON-
VERT algorithm terminates.
The crucial step in the CONVERT algorithm is step 2a, which has to be per-
formed for each bidder j, for each k from 2 to m, and for each i 2 G with
rij > k. Let us consider now a bidder j, item i, and rank k, for which step 2a
is to be performed, and let e y(S;j) be the solution as it is constructed by the
CONVERT algorithm so far. In order to guarantee that the while loop in step





Notice that in CONVERT, so far, each variable e y(S;j), with jSj = k ¡ 1 and
l being the lowest ranked item in S, has been increased at most once, namely
with (a fraction of) ^ xl;j;k¡1. Furthermore, the total value of ^ xl;j;k¡1 has been
added exclusively over variables e y(S;j) with jSj = k¡1 and l the lowest ranked
item in S. Therefore, we have that the total fraction that has been added to




Notice that the value of each variable e y(S;j) may also have been decreased in
CONVERT. Indeed, variables e y(S;j) with S containing k ¡ 1 items and the
one with the lowest rank being l, can be decreased only with (a fraction of)
variables ^ xi0;j;k with i0 ranked higher than l, and lower than i (since step 2a has
not yet been performed for rank k and item i or items ranked lower than i).
Furthermore, the total value of ^ xl;j;k has been subtracted only from variables
e y(S;j), with S containing k ¡ 1 items, all ranked higher than l. Therefore, we
have that the total fraction that has been subtracted from variables e y(S;j) with






















for each bidder j, for each k from 2 to m, and for each i 2 G with rij > k. From
(20) and (21) we conclude that (17) is true and hence the CONVERT algorithm
terminates.
11We now argue that solution ^ y is indeed feasible with respect to constraints (8),
(9), and the relaxation of (10).
For each bidder j and each item i, it is clear that after step 1,
P
S¶fig ^ y(S;j) =
^ xij1. In step 2, each value ^ xijk is spread over one or more variables ^ y(S;j)
with S containing item i. Also, for each variable ^ y(S;j) that is increased, a
variable ^ y(S n fig;j) is decreased with the same value. Therefore, after step 2, P
S¶fig ^ y(S;j) 6
Prij











Given (3), this implies that constraints (8) are satis¯ed.
For each bidder j, it is clear that after step 1 of CONVERT,
P
SµG ^ y(S;j) = P
i2G ^ xij1. In step 2, for every variable ^ y(S;j) whose value is increased, there is
some other variable ^ y(S0;j) whose value is reduced by the same amount. Given
(4), this implies that constraints (9) are satis¯ed.
Each variable ^ y(S;j) is increased by at most one variable ^ xijk. Therefore, it
follows from the relaxation of constraints (6) that ^ y(S;j) 6 1 for all S µ G and
each bidder j. By construction of the algorithm, no variable ^ y(S;j) will have a
value less than zero. Thus, ^ y satis¯es the relaxation of constraints (10).
Further, the objective function value of both solutions ^ x and ^ y is the same. Con-
sider any bidder j. After step 1, the objective function of solution ^ y has a value
equal to
P
i2G bij1^ xij1, since b(fig;j) = bij1. Every time step 2a is performed,
the objective function value is increased by (b(S[fig;j)¡b(S;j))^ xijk. Since set
S contains only items ranked higher than item i, we have b(S[fig;j)¡b(S;j) =





k=1 bij1^ xij1. Summing over all bidders j shows
that the CONVERT(^ x) procedure produces a solution ^ y with the same objective
function value as ^ x.
Finally, it is easy to see that if the CONVERT procedure is confronted with
an integral solution ^ x, it will produce an integral solution ^ y. Thus, we can
conclude that the assignment formulation and the set packing formulation are
equally strong, and that if one formulation has an integral optimal solution, this
is also the case for the other formulation. ¤
4 Branch-and-price algorithms for solving the
matrix bid auction
Theorem 3 shows that the set packing formulation (7)-(10) is equally strong
as the assignment formulation (2)-(6). Here we outline an algorithm based
on the set packing formulation. Solving the LP-relaxation of the set packing
formulation is however not trivial, given the huge amount of variables (n2m).
12Considering that only a small percentage of these variables are nonzero in an
optimal solution, column generation suggests itself as an e±cient solution tech-
nique. Column generation was proposed by Dantzig & Wolfe (1960) and starts
by solving the LP-relaxation considering only a restricted subset of the vari-
ables. This problem is also called the restricted master problem. Notice that
this problem can be restricted to m + n variables, whereas the assignment for-
mulation requires nm(m + 1)=2 variables, which may still be large. The next
step is to verify whether any of the variables that were not considered could
improve the current solution. In other words, we search for a variable with a
non-negative reduced cost. This problem is called the pricing problem. If we
¯nd such a variable, we add it to the restricted master problem and solve it
again. This re-optimizing and pricing is to be repeated until the pricing prob-
lem fails to produce new variables, indicating that the LP-relaxation has been
solved to optimality.
Notice that the column generation procedure does not guarantee to ¯nd an in-
tegral solution. In case of a fractional solution, a branching decision needs to
be made, partitioning the solution space in order to create a number of smaller
subproblems. With branch-and-price, this results in a search tree where col-
umn generation has to be applied in every node. In this way, branch-and-price
can be seen as a generalization of the column generation technique for integer
programming. Combining the column generation approach with a branching
scheme may not be straightforward. The key to an e±cient branch-and-price
algorithm is an easy-to-solve pricing problem. The branching rule should there-
fore not destroy the structure of the pricing problem or increase its complexity
when moving deeper down the search tree.
Branch-and-price has proven to be successful for solving huge integer programs
arising from a number of combinatorial problems (for an overview, we refer
to Barnhart, Johnson, Nemhauser, Savelsbergh & Vance (1998)). We refer to
Vanderbeck & Wolsey (1996) for a more elaborate description of the branch-
and-price technique. In section 4.1, we show how the LP-relaxation of the set
packing formulation for the matrix bid auction winner determination problem
can be solved e±ciently using column generation. Next, the column generation
approach is used as a building block for two branch-and-price algorithms to solve
the matrix bid auction. The algorithm in section 4.2 makes use of a branching
rule based on assigning items to bidders, whereas in section 4.3, branching is
done by deciding on the succession of items in a winning set. Finally, in section
4.4, we comment on some issues that turn out to be important while implement-
ing both branch-and-price algorithms.
4.1 Column generation for the matrix bid auction
In this section, we show how the LP-relaxation of the set packing formulation
of the matrix bid winner determination problem can be solved using column
generation. We also prove that the pricing problem can be solved in polynomial
time, since it can be solved by solving a shortest path problem.
13If we de¯ne ui for each item i 2 G as the dual price associated with the cor-
responding constraint of (8), and vj for each bidder j 2 B as the dual price
associated with the corresponding constraint of (9), we can write the dual of











ui + vj > bj(S) 8S µ G;8j 2 B (23)
ui > 0;vj > 0 8i 2 G;8j 2 B (24)
We start by ¯nding an optimal solution for the restricted master problem, i.e.
the LP-relaxation of (7)-(10) considering only a limited number of variables
y(S;j). This solution is also an optimal solution for the (unrestricted) LP-
relaxation of (7)-(10) if its corresponding dual variables form a feasible solution
for (22)-(24), which has a constraint for every variable y(S;j). Consequently,
we need to add a new column or variable to the restricted master problem
if a constraint of (23) is violated. The pricing problem thus boils down to
determining the existence of a set S of items and a bidder j such that
X
i2S
ui < bj(S) ¡ vj: (25)
Theorem 4. The pricing problem, i.e. ¯nding a set S of items and a bidder
j such that a constraint of (23) is violated, can be solved by solving a shortest
path problem.
Proof. We construct a graph with a source and a sink, and a subgraph for
each bidder j. Such a subgraph contains rij nodes for each item i, called item
nodes. We will refer to an item node as (i;j;k), where i stands for the item
and k ranges from 1 to rij. There are arcs from each node (i;j;k) to each node
(i0;j;k + 1) where item i0 is ranked lower than item i (i.e., ri0j > rij). These
arcs have a cost equal to ui0 ¡ bi0;j;k+1. Notice that there are no arcs between
nodes corresponding to di®erent subgraphs. Furthermore, for each subgraph,
there are arcs from the source node to node (i;j;1) for each item i with a cost
equal to ui ¡ bij1 and there are arcs from each item node (i;j;k) to the sink
with cost vj. A schematic representation of this graph is given in Figure 2 for
a setting with a single bidder j and three items.
From the structure of this graph, it follows that all nodes of a path from the
source to the sink correspond to the same bidder and each path contains at
most one node per item. Moreover, exactly one arc with cost vj is included in
the path. Therefore, the length of a path containing nodes (i;j;k) of the items












Figure 2: The pricing problem as a shortest path problem
X
i2S
(ui ¡ bijk) + vj (26)
Furthermore, the graph ensures that an item i is in the path using its k-th node
only if a higher ranked item is in the path through its (k ¡ 1)-th node. We
can therefore state that
P
i2S bijk = bj(S) and it follows that the existence of
a path with negative length corresponds to a violated constraint in the dual.
Consequently, we need to solve a shortest path problem on an acyclic graph in
order to solve the pricing problem.
Thus, if the shortest path has a negative length, we can add a column for the
corresponding bidder j containing the items in set S determined by the item
nodes traversed in the path. Naturally, bidder j's bid for this set S is bj(S).
Notice that since the pricing problem is solvable in polynomial time, the LP-
relaxation of the set packing formulation for the matrix bid auction can also be
solved in polynomial time.
Corollary 1. The LP-relaxation of the set packing formulation (7)-(10) for the
matrix bid auction winner determination problem can be solved in polynomial
time.
4.2 Branching on an item-bidder pair
The solution of the LP-relaxation of the matrix bid winner determination prob-
lem found by column generation may not be integral. If this is the case, we
15need to partition the solution space to eliminate this fractional solution. In this
approach, we partition the solution space by the branching decision whether or
not to assign an item to a bidder. We ¯rst prove that in a fractional solution,
there always exists an item that has been fractionally assigned to one or more
bidders.
Lemma 1. For any fractional solution to the relaxation of (7)-(10),
9i 2 G;j 2 B : 0 <
X
S:S¶fig
y(S;j) < 1 (27)
Proof. We will prove this theorem by showing that a solution must be integral
if it does not satisfy (27). Consider a solution for which property (27) is not
valid. This means that each item has been assigned fully or not at all to each
bidder. In this case, no items are split over multiple bidders. An item p for
which
P
S:S¶fpg y(S;j) = 1 could, however, still be split over multiple sets of
the same bidder j. It is easy to see that if bidder j is awarded a set S con-
taining next to p any other item q, that this item then should occur in each set
containing p in order to have the sum of the fractions of sets containing p equal
1. In other words, the sets of bidder j are identical, and we have, in fact, an
integral solution.
The branch-and-price algorithm can, however, only be valid if in every node of
the search tree, all generated columns satisfy the previously made branching
decisions. Prohibiting that an item is awarded to a certain bidder in the pricing
problem can be done by simply removing the vertices corresponding to that item
for that bidder from the graph. Enforcing that an item is awarded to a certain
bidder in the pricing problem is less obvious. For that bidder, the arcs from the
source to any lower ranked item need to be removed. Also the arcs from any
higher ranked item to any item ranked lower than that item need to be deleted.
Finally, the arcs from the higher ranked items to the sink must be removed as
well. Clearly, all nodes that can no longer be reached as a consequence of these
removals can now also be deleted, as are the arcs leaving those nodes, and so
on. For all other bidders, we need to remove the vertices of that item from
the graph. Figure 3 shows the pricing problem where item 2 is forced to be
awarded to the bidder whose item nodes are depicted. In this graph, we made
sure that every path from the source to the sink of that bidder must include a
node corresponding to item 2.
Notice that this branching rule does not destroy the structure of the pricing
problem: in all branches, the pricing problem remains a shortest path problem.
It is easy to see that this shortest path problem can be adjusted to produce
columns that comply with a series of branching decisions. Moreover, when
moving deeper down the tree, more and more arcs and nodes will be removed.
Thus, we have described a valid branching rule where the pricing problem re-
mains solvable as a shortest path problem throughout the search tree.
4.3 Branching on a pair of successive items









Figure 3: The pricing problem where the bidder must get item 2
where two constraints are covered together or not at all by the variables in one
branch, whereas in the other branch, each variable can cover at most one of
these constraints. This rule can easily be generalized to set packing problems
and can be translated to a combinatorial auction context as two items needing
to go to the same bidder in one branch and to di®erent bidders in the other
branch. However, forcing two arbitrary items to go to the same bidder, but
also forbidding that these items go to the same bidder, is not straightforward
to achieve in the shortest path problem described in section 4.1. Therefore,
we modify this branching rule, such that it takes into account the ranking of
the items speci¯ed in the bidder's matrix bid. A similar modi¯cation has been
applied for example in a pallet loading application (Moonen 2005).
We partition the solution space by branching on a pair of items p and q. In one
branch, we enforce that if item p is present in a bidder's set, then item q must
be directly successive to p in this set, when the set is sorted according to this
bidder's ranking of the items. In the other branch, no bidder can have items p
and q as direct successors in a set, according to his ranking. We ¯rst prove that
there always exists a pair of items such that the sets in which these items occur
as direct successors according to the corresponding bidder's ranking, have been
fractionally assigned to one or more bidders. We introduce the notation p !j q
to denote that item p is directly succeeded by item q in a set, according to the
ranking of bidder j.
Lemma 2. For any optimal, extreme fractional solution to the relaxation of
(7)-(10),





y(S;j) < 1 (28)
17Proof. Assume that we have an optimal, extreme fractional solution for which
(28) is not satis¯ed. This means that for each pair of items, each bid on a set in
which these items are direct successors according to ranking of the bidder that
made the bid, has been assigned to that bidder for a total fraction of 0 or 1.




S:S¶fp;qg^p!jq y(S;j) = 1, we
can conclude that if item p is present in a set, that then also item q is present
in this set. Therefore, each pair of sets to which a positive fraction has been as-
signed is disjoint or identical. Since there is a single variable y(S;j) representing
identical sets of the same bidder j, we conclude that identical sets must be split
over multiple bidders. This leaves us with the problem of assigning a number
of disjoint sets among one or more bidders, where each assignment of a set to
a bidder has its pro¯t, namely the bid of this bidder for this set. This problem
is a maximum weighted assignment problem on a bipartite graph, where each
node on one side of the partition represents a set, and each node on the other
side of the partition represents a bidder. It follows that each optimal, extreme
solution is integral. Consequently, for any optimal, extreme fractional solution
to the relaxation of (7)-(10), property (28) is true.
The above theorem shows that it is always possible to ¯nd a pair of items p and
q on which to branch. However, we still need to enforce that the pricing prob-
lem will generate columns that satisfy the constraint imposed by the branching
decision. In the branch where we impose p !j q, for each bidder j, we need to
remove all arcs from nodes corresponding to p to any node not corresponding
to q. Notice that for a bidder that ranks q higher than p, this comes down to
removing all nodes related to p from the graph. This leaves us with a graph
where if one arrives in a node related to p, the only option is to take an arc to a
node related to q. In the branch where p should not be directly succeeded by q,
it su±ces, for each bidder, to remove the arcs going from a p-node to a q-node,
if they exist.
Notice this branching rule does not destroy the structure of the pricing problem
either, even when we consider a sequence of branching decisions. Indeed, it is
not hard to verify that when going deeper into the search tree, the pricing prob-
lem can still be solved as a shortest path problem on an increasingly smaller
graph.
4.4 Implementation issues
Both branch-and-price algorithms were implemented using Visual C++ 6.0.
The set packing problems were solved using Ilog Cplex 8.1. The LEDA libraries
(version 5.0.1) allowed us to solve the shortest path problems in linear time.
In the remainder of this section, some of the most important implementation
issues are discussed.
4.4.1 Solving the root node
A ¯rst issue that needs to be solved is determining which columns will be used
in the very ¯rst restricted master problem. Using many columns obviously in-
creases the computation time needed to solve the restricted master problem. On
18the other hand, this may result in a solution that is closer to the optimal solu-
tion, such that less iterations for solving the pricing problem and re-optimizing
are needed. In our case, after experimenting with a number of settings, it turned
out that including a rather large number of variables to start the column genera-
tion process pays o®. We constructed a set for every strictly positive entry in the
matrix bid by taking the item corresponding to this entry and completing the set
with the k highest ranked items, where k is the entry's column in the matrix bid.
After the restricted master problem has been solved and the corresponding dual
solution has been obtained, new columns with a non-negative reduced cost need
to be added. The question remains how many such columns we should add.
Again, adding too many new variables increases the computation time for solv-
ing the resulting restricted master problem, whereas adding too few variables
can result in a large number of iterations for solving the pricing problem and
re-optimizing. The strategy that proved to be the most e±cient consists of
adding for each bidder those variables whose reduced cost is at most 2% less
than the most positive reduced cost for a variable from that bidder. Further-
more, the number of such variables that is added for each bidder cannot exceed
the number of items. Notice that ¯nding these variables demands very little
extra computation time, since the LEDA libraries provide the distance from the
source to each node in the graph, after having solved the shortest path problem.
Finally, when re-optimizing the restricted master problem, we start from the
optimal base of the previous iteration. In order not to drag along too many
columns for the remainder of the search tree, those columns that were added
at some iteration, but never made part of any base solution are removed from
the model. We keep the other columns, assuming that they will be useful again
later.
4.4.2 A selection rule when branching on an item-bidder pair
The major issue in implementing this branching rule is to choose the item on
which to branch and the bidder(s) to assign it to. We chose to branch on the
item that is fractionally assigned to the highest number of bidders. For each
of these bidders, a branch is constructed in which the bidder is assigned the
item. A ¯nal branch is added where none of these bidders is allowed to receive
the item. We opted for a depth-¯rst strategy, where the branch where the item
is assigned to the bidder with the highest fraction is explored ¯rst. Thus, the
branch where bidders are disallowed to receive an item always comes last.
4.4.3 A selection rule when branching on a pair of successive items
With this branching rule, each node that needs further partitioning of the solu-
tion space leads to two branches. In the ¯rst branch, we enforce that for each
bidder, if item p is present in a bid, q should be the next item in that bid,
according to the ranking of that bidder. The second branch considers only bids
for which p and q are no direct successors according to the bidder's ranking. We
again chose a depth-¯rst strategy, where the branch where p !j q is imposed is
explored ¯rst. The question remains how to select the items p and q. We opted




S:S¶fp;qg^p!jq y(S;j) is closest
to 0.5.
4.4.4 Solving a tree node
Before we can start solving a node of the tree, we remove all columns that do
not satisfy the latest branching decision. In case of backtracking, this branch-
ing decision expires and those columns are re-entered into the model, since we
experienced that they often turn out to be useful in other branches of the tree.
The LP objective value of the node can be used as an upper bound to the
integral solution that could be found further down the tree. Clearly, if this
value is lower than the incumbent found so far, the node can be pruned. It
may, however, require a large number of iterations to prove LP optimality.
Vanderbeck & Wolsey (1996) show that the Lagrangian relaxation can also be
used as an upper bound. The Lagrangian upper bound can be computed as (see







where ± is the objective value of the restricted master and RC(S;j) is the
reduced cost of variable y(S;j). Notice that the computation of this bound
requires little additional computational e®ort, since the pricing problem, which
is solved for every bidder j anyway, ¯nds the variable with the highest reduced
cost. This upper bound is referred to as the Lagrangian upper bound, since
it equals the bound obtained by Lagrange relaxation (Lasdon 1970). If at any
iteration in the column generation process, the Lagrangian upper bound is lower
than the incumbent, we can prune the node, without any risk of missing the
optimal solution.
Obviously, when we re-optimize the restricted master problem, we also start
from the optimal base of the previous iteration. The ¯rst restricted master
problem is solved starting from the base solution of the parent node. Further-
more, as in the root node, we delete the added columns that turned out not to
be useful.
5 Computational results
In this section, we elaborate on how we generated the instances on which the
branch-and-price algorithms were tested. We also give an overview of the com-
putational results and compare them with results from a branch-and-cut ap-
proach performed on the assignment formulation.
205.1 Structure of the instances
Unfortunately, real-life data for combinatorial auctions are not abundantly avail-
able for the public. It is therefore not uncommon in combinatorial auction lit-
erature to turn to randomly generated data (see for instance Leyton-Brown,
Shoham & Tennenholtz (2000), Sandholm (2002), and Parkes (1999)). For a
thorough discussion on the empirical hardness of several data distributions com-
monly used for combinatorial auctions, we refer to Leyton-Brown, Nudelman &
Shoham (2005).
For our instances, each matrix bid is composed according to a bid type, ran-
domly chosen out of the six possibilities discussed in Day (2004) (additive pref-
erence bids, single-minded bids, nested °at bids, nested k-of bids, partition bids,
and add-on bids) and a bid type that has non-increasing rows and columns. In
order to avoid auctions for which the exact solution of the winner determination
problem is obvious, the matrix bids are constructed such that they are competi-
tive. Furthermore, there is a parameter H that bounds the highest incremental
value an item brings to a set. For more details on the bid types or on how the
instances were generated, we refer to Day (2004).
We performed experiments on matrix bid auctions with 5, 10, 25 or 50 items
and 5, 10, 25, 50, 75 or 100 bidders. For each combination, 10 instances were
generated and solved to optimality. The highest incremental value per item (H)
was limited to 10. We have no indication that the branch-and-price algorithm
performs di®erently with other settings for H. All computational experiments
were done on a desktop computer with a Pentium IV 2 GHz processor, with
512 MB RAM.
5.2 Results
Tables 1 and 2 give an overview of the average computation times needed to
solve the matrix bid auction winner determination problem using branch-and-
price with branching on an item-bidder pair (BOI) and branch-and-price with
branching on a pair of successive of items (BOS) respectively. In Table 3, we
give the average computation times that resulted from solving the assignment
based formulation (2)-(6) with the Ilog Cplex 8.1 branch-and-cut algorithm
with standard settings (B&C), which is basically the approach followed in Day
& Raghavan (2006). Horizontally, the number of bidders n varies from 5 to
100, while the number of items m auctioned ranges from 5 to 50 vertically. All
computation times are expressed in seconds.
As could be expected, the computation time is determined more by the number
of items in the auction, than by the number of bidders. All instances with up
to 10 items are solved in less than a second by all algorithms; here the branch-
and-price algorithms clearly perform better. Auctions with 50 items are also
solved in less than 20 minutes on average by all algorithms. The branch-and-cut
algorithm seems on average the fastest way to solve these instances. Perhaps
surprisingly, for the branch-and-price algorithms, the computation times for the
25 and 50 item instances do not always increase when more bidders come into
21n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.017 0.027 0.038
10 0.027 0.038 0.053 0.088 0.118 0.169
25 0.636 0.597 1.157 4.292 12.704 49.155
50 247.224 60.711 437.951 557.083 622.591 802.483
Table 1: Average computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using BOI
n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.027 0.038
10 0.033 0.037 0.044 0.067 0.104 0.182
25 0.698 0.767 1.194 3.814 16.300 97.122
50 76.598 67.584 843.435 259.079 645.632 983.539
Table 2: Average computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using BOS
n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.030 0.027 0.049 0.052 0.070 0.102
10 0.050 0.069 0.140 0.278 0.524 0.748
25 0.757 1.391 3.598 10.689 17.584 31.940
50 57.676 28.333 91.230 215.083 355.785 811.960
Table 3: Average computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using B&C
play. This can be explained by the fact that the computation times for the
individual instances tend to vary considerably.
One way to get a more accurate view on what the underlying trend is, is to
consider a larger sample set. Also, it is not uncommon in literature on combi-
natorial auctions to study the median instead (see for instance Sandholm, Suri,
Gilpin & Levine (2005) and Hoos & Boutilier (2000)). Tables 4 to 6 give an
overview of the median computation times needed to solve the winner determi-
nation problem. The tables shows a clear trend of how the computation times
rise with the number of bidders and the number of items, since the median is
less a®ected by extreme values. It is also con¯rmed that the branch-and-price
algorithms manage to solve the majority of the instances with many items a
lot faster than re°ected by the average computation times. The branch-and-cut
algorithm seems to su®er less from instances with extreme computation times,
since the median computation time is much closer to the average computa-
tion time. The results show that computation times for the branch-and-price
algorithm with branching on an item-bidder pair rise more severely with an in-
creasing number of items than those of the branch-and-cut algorithm. On the
other hand, the branch-and-price algorithm with branching on an item-bidder
pair handles an increasing number of bidders better than the branch-and-cut
22n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040
10 0.015 0.020 0.055 0.055 0.105 0.130
25 0.480 0.460 0.760 2.445 9.480 16.825
50 20.855 29.105 45.605 129.870 227.370 353.970
Table 4: Median computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using BOI
n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040
10 0.015 0.020 0.040 0.055 0.100 0.130
25 0.485 0.495 0.815 2.445 6.790 13.605
50 20.855 29.215 37.970 129.870 238.785 514.370
Table 5: Median computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using BOS
n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.020 0.025 0.040 0.050 0.070 0.105
10 0.040 0.060 0.140 0.260 0.535 0.740
25 0.530 1.235 3.245 10.595 18.120 28.960
50 14.665 22.615 73.035 191.670 350.340 589.940
Table 6: Median computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using B&C
algorithm. Furthermore, apart from a couple of exceptions, the median compu-
tation times are lower with branch-and-price than with branch-and-cut.
Tables 7 and 8 give the average computation times for solving the LP-relaxation
of the set packing formulation (7)-(10) and the assignment formulation (2)-(6)
respectively. Recall that the former is used in both branch-and-price algorithms,
while the latter is used in the branch-and-cut algorithm. The tables might be
in°uenced by the fact that the LP-relaxation of both formulations can be solved
in polynomial time. Furthermore, with two exceptions, the LP-relaxation of the
set packing formulation is solved faster than the the LP-relaxation of the as-
signment formulation. Between brackets, the number of instances out of 10 for
which the LP-relaxation resulted in an integral solution is indicated. Notice
that Theorem 3 does not imply that these numbers should be at least as high
for the assignment formulation than for the set packing formulation. Indeed, if
there exists an integral optimal solution, the algorithms may not ¯nd it as there
may be fractional solutions with the same objective value. Further, the num-
ber of instances for which an integral optimal solution was found remains more
or less constant over the bidders, while it drops for instances with more items.
Not surprisingly, instances with an integral LP-relaxation have low computation
times. Therefore, the ¯gures in Table 7 partially explain the °uctuations in aver-
23n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.01 [8] 0.01 [8] 0.01 [7] 0.02 [9] 0.03 [10] 0.04 [10]
10 0.01 [6] 0.02 [9] 0.03 [4] 0.05 [8] 0.09 [8] 0.14 [7]
25 0.31 [3] 0.41 [7] 0.80 [8] 2.12 [8] 3.29 [5] 4.71 [4]
50 14.02 [5] 14.96 [6] 32.93 [4] 74.46 [7] 124.29 [5] 116.19 [4]
Table 7: Average computation times [s] for the LP-relaxation of the set packing for-
mulation for n bidders and m items
n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.01 [8] 0.02 [9] 0.02 [8] 0.03 [8] 0.04 [10] 0.04 [9]
10 0.02 [6] 0.03 [9] 0.05 [5] 0.09 [7] 0.14 [7] 0.20 [8]
25 0.28 [5] 0.51 [8] 1.61 [7] 4.47 [9] 6.03 [5] 8.35 [5]
50 9.40 [5] 20.01 [6] 43.93 [3] 159.46 [6] 313.76 [4] 461.91 [4]
Table 8: Average computation times [s] for the LP-relaxation of the assignment for-
mulation for n bidders and m items
age computation times for the instances with 25 or 50 items (see Tables 1 and 2).
Finally, Table 9 gives an overview of the performance details of the three al-
gorithms. Column A gives the average number of nodes in the branching tree
that were explored. Column B represents the average number of pricing rounds,
and column C gives the average number of variables that were generated (these
columns are not applicable for the branch-and-cut algorithm). On the rows, we
¯nd the instances, where the ¯rst number indicates the number of items and
the second gives the number of bidders. There seems to be no systematic di®er-
ence between the branch-and-price algorithms for any of the three parameters
described in this table. The branch-and-cut algorithm solves very little nodes
in its branching tree, compared to the branch-and-price algorithms. In many
cases, the branch-and-cut algorithm prefers generating valid inequalities in the
root node to branching.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the winner determination problem for the matrix bid
auction. We ¯rst looked at a special case of the matrix bid auction, namely
where all bidders have an identical ranking of the items. For this auction, we
found that that there exists no polynomial-time approximation scheme for the
winner determination problem, unless P = NP. However, there exists a poly-
nomial time algorithm in the case the number of bidders is ¯xed. Then, we
compared two mathematical formulations for the winner determination prob-
lem of the general matrix bid auction. One assignment is based on the assign-
ment problem, while the other is based on the set packing problem. We found
24BOI BOS B&C
Inst. A B C A B C A
5-5 2.2 3.9 33.3 2.4 4.7 34.4 1.0
5-10 1.3 3.7 68.4 1.4 3.4 68.3 1.0
5-25 2.5 4.5 142.2 1.6 3.2 141.6 1.0
5-50 1.3 3.2 266.9 1.2 3.1 266.9 1.0
5-75 1.0 2.4 435.9 1.0 2.4 435.9 1.0
5-100 1.0 2.0 565.0 1.0 2.0 565.0 1.0
10-5 7.6 18.3 124.2 9.4 27.5 93.7 1.2
10-10 7.6 16.5 201.8 5.4 16.8 193.8 1.5
10-25 4.9 10.2 363.8 2.8 8.4 352.0 1.0
10-50 3.7 8.0 788.9 1.8 5.4 782.2 1.0
10-75 2.3 6.9 1,117.7 1.6 6.0 1,113.8 1.0
10-100 2.3 7.0 1,459.5 2.6 8.4 1,455.4 1.0
25-5 7.7 72.3 1,017.7 6.4 89.4 723.1 1.2
25-10 2.0 37.8 990.7 6.8 51.7 864.5 1.5
25-25 4.4 31.2 1,793.3 3.8 33.2 1,752.1 1.0
25-50 8.6 59.7 3,703.2 5.2 55.1 3,602.4 1.0
25-75 30.0 123.5 5,402.7 32.8 143.1 5,412.7 1.0
25-100 96.8 349.3 7,564.0 163.0 635.3 7,895.2 1.3
50-5 21.4 3,095.8 4,745.9 37.9 1,279.2 2,872.6 11.8
50-10 12.2 592.6 3,963.3 27.9 611.7 4,112.8 1.0
50-25 315.1 1,494.0 11,752.4 1,029.6 2,806.7 10,141.0 1.2
50-50 361.6 938.5 16,278.1 67.6 468.4 14,359.3 1.0
50-75 102.5 828.5 20,773.4 106.7 852.0 20,776.0 1.0
50-100 96.0 839.5 30,538.0 100.4 995.4 31,120.3 5.7
Table 9: Performance details for the three algorithms (BOI, BOS, B&C)
25that both formulations are equally strong. Moreover, an integral solution for
one formulation can always be translated to an integral solution for the other
formulation. We used the set packing formulation as a basis for a column gen-
eration approach where the pricing problem can be solved as a shortest path
problem. This means that we are able to solve the LP-relaxation of the set
packing formulation in polynomial time. We then extended this approach to
two branch-and-price algorithms. In one algorithm, we branch on the items,
while in the other, branching is done on the succession of the items. The pric-
ing problem for these branch-and-price algorithms remains solvable as a short-
est path problem throughout the search tree. These algorithms are tested on
randomly generated instances with up to 50 items and 100 bidders, which they
solved within 20 minutes (on average). Finally, the branch-and-price algorithms
withstood the comparison with a branch-and-cut algorithm, based on Day &
Raghavan (2006). The algorithms perform better on instances with up to 10
items, but are outperformed by the branch-and-cut algorithm on some of the
larger instances. The increase in computation time, however, seems favorable
for the branch-and-price algorithms, which indicates that they form at least a
viable approach to solve instances of the matrix bid auction winner determina-
tion problem.
References
Barnhart, C., Johnson, E. L., Nemhauser, G. L., Savelsbergh, M. W. P. &
Vance, P. H. (1998). Branch-and-price: column generation for solving huge
integer programs, Operations Research 46: 316{329.
BeliÄ en, J. (2006). Exact and heuristic methodologies for scheduling in hos-
pitals: problems, formulations and algorithms, PhD thesis, K.U.Leuven.
Bleischwitz, Y. & Kliewer, G. (2005). Accelerating Vickrey payment com-
putation in combinatorial auctions for an airline alliance., in WEA '05:
Proceedings of the 4th international workshop on experimental and e±cient
algorithms, Santorini Island, Greece, Springer, pp. 228{239.
Dantzig, G. B. & Wolfe, P. (1960). Decomposition principle for linear
programs, Operations Research 8: 101{111.
Day, R. W. (2004). Expressing preferences with price-vector agents in com-
binatorial auctions, PhD thesis, University of Maryland.
Day, R. W. & Raghavan, S. (2006). Matrix bidding in combinatorial auc-
tions. Manuscript.
de Vries, S. & Vohra, R. V. (2003). Combinatorial auctions: a survey,
INFORMS Journal on Computing (3): 284{309.
Goossens, D., Maas, A. J. T., Spieksma, F. C. R. & van de Klundert, J. J.
(2007). Exact algorithms for procurement problems under a total quantity
discount structure, European Journal of Operational Research 178(2): 603{
626.
26Goossens, D. & Spieksma, F. C. R. (2006). The matrix bid auction: micro-
economic properties and expressiveness, FETEW Research Report KBI-
0619, K.U.Leuven.
Hoos, H. & Boutilier, C. (2000). Solving combinatorial auctions using
stochastic local search, in AAAI/IAAI '00: Proceedings of the 17th na-
tional conference on arti¯cial intelligence and 12th conference on innova-
tive applications of arti¯cial intelligence, Austin, USA, AAAI Press/The
MIT Press, pp. 22{29.
Kann, V. (1991). Maximum bounded 3-dimensional matching is max snp-
complete, Information Processing Letters 37(1): 27{35.
Lasdon, L. (1970). Optimization theory for large systems, MacMillan.
Leyton-Brown, K., Nudelman, E. & Shoham, Y. (2005). Empirical hard-
ness models for combinatorial auctions, in P. Cramton, R. Steinberg &
Y. Shoham (eds), Combinatorial auctions, MIT Press, pp. 479{504.
Leyton-Brown, K. & Shoham, Y. (2005). A test suite for combinatorial
auctions, in P. Cramton, R. Steinberg & Y. Shoham (eds), Combinatorial
auctions, MIT Press, pp. 451{478.
Leyton-Brown, K., Shoham, Y. & Tennenholtz, M. (2000). An algorithm
for multi-unit combinatorial auctions, in AAAI/IAAI '00: Proceedings of
the 17th national conference on arti¯cial intelligence and 12th conference
on innovative applications of arti¯cial intelligence, Austin, USA, AAAI
Press / The MIT Press, pp. 56{61.
Moonen, L. (2005). Algorithms for some graph-theoretical optimization
problems, PhD thesis, K.U.Leuven.
Nisan, N. (2000). Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions, in
EC '00: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on electronic commerce,
Minneapolis, USA, ACM Press, pp. 1{12.
Parkes, D. C. (1999). iBundle: an e±cient ascending price bundle auction,
in EC '99: Proceedings of the ACM conference on electronic commerce,
Denver, USA, ACM Press, pp. 148{157.
Petrank, E. (1994). The hardness of approximation: gap location, Compu-
tational Complexity 4(2): 133{157.
Rothkopf, M., Peke» c, A. & Harstad, R. M. (1998). Computationally man-
ageable combinational auctions, Management Science 44(8): 1131{1147.
Ryan, D. & Foster, B. (1981). An integer programming approach to
scheduling, in A. Wren (ed.), Computer scheduling of public transport: ur-
ban passenger vehicle and crew scheduling, North-Holland, pp. 269{280.
Sandholm, T. (2002). Algorithm for optimal winner determination in com-
binatorial auctions, Arti¯cial Intelligence 135(1-2): 1{54.
27Sandholm, T., Suri, S., Gilpin, A. & Levine, D. (2005). CABOB: a fast op-
timal algorithm for combinatorial auctions, Management Science 51: 374{
390.
Tennenholtz, M. (2002). Tractable combinatorial auctions and b-matching,
Arti¯cial Intelligence 140(1/2): 231{243.
Vanderbeck, F. & Wolsey, L. (1996). An exact algorithm for ip column
generation, Operations Research Letters 19: 151{159.
28